Fortunately for New Orleans, officials in Louisiana were able to evaluate and refine their evacuation plan based on two “practice runs.” In 1998, Hurricane Georges appeared to be heading directly for the city, leading to the first major evacuation in some 20 years. From that experience, it was apparent that making conventional use of available routes in the region was not an adequate strategy. As a result, the Louisiana State Police (LSP) developed a plan to implement two short segments of contraflow (LSP, 2000).
Six years later, Hurricane Ivan threatened another direct hit on the city, triggering an implementation of the new plan and the first-ever implementation of evacuation contraflow in Louisiana. Like Georges, Ivan tracked east prior to landfall and largely missed Louisiana. The evacuation that it precipitated, however, revealed numerous deficiencies in the plan that resulted in monumental congestion and delays on several key evacuation routes.
After a period of considerable public criticism, the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (LA DOTD) and LSP formed a Louisiana Evacuation Task Force with input from consultants in industry and academia to identify where and how the congestion occurred and to develop and test ways to reduce it.
A major failure of the plans for evacuating the low-mobility population was the lack of communication. Evacuation plans can only be effective if people are aware of them, and evacuation orders can only be heeded if they are received in time. The of problem evacuating low-mobility populations will be one of the most important issues for all levels of government in future evacuation plans. Although some seek safety inside the Dome, which was allotted as the refuge of last resort.
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